A Critique of Judith Butler's "Gender Trouble"

Grecia Hernandez

September 07, 2010

PS 110

Essentialist Claims Disable Effective Politics

            Feminism is supposed to open new possibilities in the world of politics. According to Judith Butler, these possibilities are only possible through a certain deconstruction of categories that are based on essentialist claims. Benhabib’s understanding of feminism and the politics it should seek are fundamentally rooted in the socially and foundational constructed concepts of self, subject and agency. The main debate between the two philosophers comes from their different versions of what agency is. Butler’s account of gender performativity enables a destabilization of gender categories/norms and puts forth a convincing conception of agency through the process of contestation, reconstruction and resignification. Benhabib however, falls short in opening new doors for feminist politics and instead falls into the same trap of putting forth a subject or self before the doing of politics which only limits and constrains the advancements that feminism seeks.

            A central key to understanding “Gender Trouble,” is Butler's account of gender performativity and what it means to learn one’s gender. In her view, gender is not something that is natural it is rather a doing of gestures, of bodily acts that have through time, been rooted in some feminine or masculine identity. One learns to perform their gender through the socially constructed actions pertaining to that specific gender. The doing of gender is what creates the inner gender identity that is believed to be natural. She explains that it is through the repetition of bodily acts, gestures and desires that the production of gender is made and then it is internalized in its belief that it is a natural substance, “Acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body … Such acts, gestures enactments generally construed, are performative …” (Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, 185).  What is being argued is that there is no naturalness to be found in gender identity. The acts and bodily gestures that seek to compose a gender identity are forged; they’re nothing but fabrications of social discourses and bodily signs with no “natural” foundation (Butler, 185).

            Gender performativity is significant to Butler’s argument because the grounds for any identity to be a natural one are eliminated: gender has no ontological status.  This explanation is extremely important for the kind of politics that could emerge from Butler’s account. With an elimination of an ontological status of an identity, the emergence of new discourses is enabled. “That the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality. This also suggests that if that reality is fabricated as an interior essence, that very interiority is an effect and function of social discourse and [used as] public regulation, (Butler, 186). Gender performativity has produced an illusion of an interior core, merely to organize and regulate society and politics. In other words it has fabricated and placed heterosexuality as the privileged norm and has excluded those that fall outside this norm. This is problematic for the kind of politics feminism should seek because the presumption that a specific gender identity is natural render some lives unintelligible. If there is an established identity as the “norm” then the politics that emerge from that are tainted by the very cultural constructions feminism seeks to be liberated from.

            Butler’s account of gender performativity avoids falling into the trap of conceiving of cultural construction in terms of either free will or determinism in that no theory of the self is given. There is no “self” in Butler’s view, so nothing can be said to determine the self. Focus is placed on the subject and how it is produced. The subject is a category made through language and so is completely different from conceptions of the “self” (Feminist Contentions, 135). Gender performativity is not a behaviorist model and does not seek to determine anything: “A performative act is one which brings into being or enacts that which it names, and so marks the constitutive or productive power of discourse … [When] words engage actions or constitute themselves a kind of action, they do this not because they reflect the power of an individual’s will or intention, but because they draw upon and reengage conventions …” (Feminist Contentions, 134). To clarify, the subject is distinct from the self, and what Butler seeks to understand is how this subject is produced. The notion of a “self,” has no place in Butler’s account of gender performativity and therefore cannot be said to be determined by anything. Free will or anything else that is internal cannot determine how society will perceive or judge that individual. Society will judge based on how well a gender identity is performed.

            Seyla Benhabib’s account of agency requires a concept of the “self,” and of free will, this is because politics require agents in order to be autonomous. Therefore she finds many issues with Butler’s account of gender performativity. However, Benhabib fails to notice that Butler does not offer a theory of the “self” and that for Butler the subject is distinct from the self proposed by Benhabib. Benhabib’s issue with Butler’s account of gender performativity is: “I doubt whether Butler’s performative theory of the constitution of gender identity can do justice to the complexities of the ontogenetic origins of gender identity in the human person on the one hand, and whether this view can anticipate, indicate a new configuration of subjectivity (Benhabib, Feminist Contentions, 108).  In Benhabib’s view, Butler’s gender performativity has failed to give the possibility of agency or self-reflexivity, which is needed to determine, “What mechanisms and dynamics are involved in the developmental process through which the human infant becomes a distinct self with the ability to speak its language and the ability to participate in [society]” (Benhabib, Feminist Contentions, 109).  This is why Benhabib is so critical of Butler’s conception of the subject but she does not realize the distinction made by Butler in her explanation of what it means to constitute a subject and how it is distinct from a concept of a “self.”

            The distinction between what it means to be constituted and what it means to be determined is made in Gender Trouble in the discussion of signification and is crucial to understanding Butler’s argument.  Butler states, “When the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that the subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern the intelligible invocation of identity. The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act …” (Butler, 198). Benhabib does not understand this distinction however and so misunderstands the entire account put forth by Butler on gender performativity. Butler’s argument is that Benhabib (in misunderstanding gender performativity) has made the mistake of repositioning the subject behind the deed and consequently reduced gender performativity to a theatrical performance; she assumed that there was an actor behind the performance (Lecture, 09/08). “The category of ‘intention,’ indeed, the notion of ‘the doer’ will have its place, but this place will no longer be behind the deed as its enabling source. If the subject—a category within language and, hence, distinct from what Benhabib will call a ‘self’—is performatively constituted, then it follows that this will be a constitution in time, and change the ‘I’ and ‘we’ will be neither fully determined by language …” (Butler, Feminist Contentions, 135).

            Butler argues that for Benhabib to place the doer before the deed is to fall into the same trap that so many other feminists do and therefore fails to enable the politics needed for feminism. To assume or claim that any identity (be it gender, racial or ethnic) has some essentialist foundation is extremely dangerous for politics. This because when such a claim or assumption is made, it risks becoming a normative category. Normative categories then create serious issues for those who fall outside of the norm, it excludes through its exclusionary practices (Lecture, 09/01). It is important to clarify that Butler’s goal is not to eliminate the subject entirely but to interrogate it and question how it came to be produced. She believes that there is no state of nature, or any natural state of being (Death of Man) and that everything society knows is culturally constructed. The subject cannot displace itself far enough from the very thing that produces it so if there is a self, it is not natural or pure. Essentialist claims should have no place in politics, according to Butler because it creates exclusionary categories. If any politics should emerge from feminism, there needs to be a deconstruction of the very subject of feminism, and of the categories it seeks to represent.

            Deconstructing the subject of feminism in Butler’s view is required in order to help realize the radical democratic impulse of feminist politics. This requires a destabilization of normative categories. Butler’s account of drag as a subversive bodily act is important because it is through such acts that the destabilization of norms can occur. In Gender Trouble, Butler explains drag as an imitation of gender: “In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency” (Butler, 187).  The denaturalization of sex and gender occurs in drag’s performance of a feminine identity, an identity believed to be “natural” or “inherent.” Drag exposes gender identities as false, and easily replicated. Drag destabilizes the idea that a true, natural gender identity is possible. It mocks the very idea of an imagined identity (Lecture, 09/02).  This sort of deconstruction undermines the categories put forth by norms and enables the reestablishment of new categories that remain open to contestation; open to new interpretations so as to avoid exclusionary categories. This deconstruction is needed for feminist politics because in Butler’s view, feminist politics should question and contest the very basis of feminism and the goals it seeks to achieve. This questioning and contestation is done through deconstructing and destabilizing gender norms and is highly democratic because it doesn’t just assume, it questions and interrogates the way an identity or category comes into being.

             For Butler, agency is found through the continuous contestation following the formations of categories and through resignification. “Paradoxically, the re-conceptualization of identity as an effect, that is, as produced or generated, opens up possibilities of ‘agency’ that are insidiously foreclosed by positions that take identity categories as foundational and fixed, (Butler, 201).  For Butler, construction does not go against agency, she recognizes that it is required for politics: “[construction is the necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible,” (Butler, 201).  Agency is also possible through resignification, or the repetition of new bodily acts and gestures. These new acts will require time in order for there to be a meaning cemented within them, but she allows for this possibility to occur.

            Benhabib’s accounts of subject and agency have to do with the self and it is only through this stable subject that feminist politics can emerge. She criticizes Butler’s “Death of Subject, as incompatible with the goals of feminism. “The situated and gendered subject is heteronomously determined but still strives toward autonomy. I want to ask how in fact the very project of a female emancipation would even be thinkable without such a regulative principle of agency, autonomy and selfhood,” (Benhabib, Feminist Contentions, 21).  She does not realize that Butler has put forth several accounts of agency (through the reconstruction of new categories, contestation and resignification), whether these accounts are easily accessible is hard to determine but their existence cannot be denied). Butler does not believe in the nature of man or the nature of a subject, and Benhabib takes this to mean that she wants to do away with the subject altogether.

            Butler’s main goal is to deconstruct the essentialist claims that feminists have so often used to give their arguments credibility. She suggests that, “The identity categories often presumed to be foundational to feminist politics…. simultaneously work to limit and constrain the very cultural possibilities that feminism is supposed to open up,” (Butler, Gender Trouble, 201). She puts forth a more convincing account of agency through her explanation of drag and how it destabilizes gender identities as well as in her explanation of contestation and resignification. Benhabib’s account of agency while it is more accessible does not open up the kind of politics required for advancement. Butler’s account of agency is more difficult to fulfill and would take a lot of time, but it would fulfill feminism’s purpose.

Works Cited

Benhabib, Seyla, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser. Feminist Contentions.             New York & London: Routledge, 1995. Print.

Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. New York & London: Routledge, 1990. Print.

             

Research Paper Work

Grecia Hernandez

Political Science 121

February 24, 2010

States in The International System

            Neorealism and neoliberalism are two different schools of thought in international relations that attempt to explain the reasons why the international community (with states as the primary actors) behave the way they do. Both schools agree that states coexist in an anarchic international system. This means there is no central authority to govern, pass laws, or resolve international issues. Neoliberalsim was formed as a response to neorealism and argues that within an anarchy system states are still capable to behave cooperatively with one another. Neorealism takes a much less optimistic stance in arguing that since states are primarily concerned with their security and self interests, lasting cooperation among states is unlikely. Although both theories make valid points for their arguments, neorealism has the most validity in our present day system and will most likely prevail in the future because despite the possibility of  neoliberalist goals, there will be no progress made unless the powerful states willingly give up some of their power in return for a more “cooperative” community.

            Neorealism focuses on the power and security of the state as its main concern. It understands that in an anarchic community, the state bears the responsibility of its own survival and cannot depend on any other actor. Therefore in neorealism the importance of strength and military power prevail any other set of concerns for the state. Under neorealism the state’s main way of staying powerful is through acquiring military power, so that in case it is threatened it has the means to not only defend itself but overcome any opponent. A prominent and significant neo-realist, Kenneth Waltz, argues that the ultimate concern of states is their security and their own national interests. He focuses mainly on the structure of the international system and how this structure is the primary causal factor for explaining the nature of our international community. In Jackson and Sorenson’s discussion of Watlz they highlight some of Watlz’s main claims about neorealsim: “Watlz notes that the international system in anarchy… Second, the international system is composed of like units: every state, small or large, has to perform a similar set of government functions…” (Jackson & Sorenson, 45). His conclusion basically states that because of the anarchic system we live in, competition and conflict inevitably occur and because of this, states will always strive and fight to have power in the international arena. “For Waltz states are power-seeking and security-conscious not because of human nature but rather because the structure of the international system compels them to be that way” (Jackson & Sorenson, 45). For example after World War II, the international system was dominated by two super powers: United States and Britain. Waltz believes that by looking at the structure of the international system, several key things can be explained. One is that “great powers will always tend to balance each other out,” (Jackson & Sorensen, 45). Second is that the weaker states will ally themselves with more powerful states in order to keep safe from enemies that would be able to defeat them. Since this is the nature of the anarchic international system states will always be looking out for their own security, by increasing their military force. This is not to say that neo-realists deny the possibility of cooperation among states, but they argue that unless the entire system changes, cooperation is not likely. And in order for the international system to change, states would have to give up some of their security and power. This is something that is truly unlikely, especially in today’s modern era, where states are concerned with acquiring nuclear weapons in order to sustain their survival. Although Jackson and Sorensen state that there hasn’t been much armed conflict among the liberal democracies, there has been “trade wars and other disputes between the Western democracies which appeared to confirm the neorealist hypothesis about competition between self-interested countries (Jackson & Sorenson, 46).

            Neoliberalism is a response to neorealsim and its only major challenge (Betts, 119). It employs a much more optimistic view of the world in international relations. This school of thought believes that international cooperation is possible if states focus on building an international system with the state actors focused on building economic incentives for international cooperation. Neo-liberalist believe that if states focus on the possibility of mutual wins, meaning everyone has an economic incentive to cooperate with one another, then international cooperation is definitely a lucrative possibility. The argument here is that cooperation can emerge from institutions, the type of government, and social norms.  Attention is laid on the economic aspects of international relations. They want a decentralized system with economic power as the main goals for states.  Neo-liberalist like Keohane and Nye have developed a theory of “complex interdependence,” which they argue, “provides a better portrayal of reality [than neorealism]” (Betts, 162).  Complex interdependence has three main characteristics:  First, states are the primary and most important actors in the international community; second, there is no hierarchy among multiple issues, and military power does not dominate the political agenda as it does in neorealism; and third is that military force could be a useful instrument of policy (Betts, 162). However, in this school of thought, military force plays only a minor role except in regards to alliances. The way to gain complex interdependence is through global trade, investment (FDI, FPI, banks) , and intra-industry trade (Lecture, 02/02).  In neorealism, military force is crucial to the state’s survival in the anarchic system because without security they cannot focus on other international issues.

            While neoliberalism and theorists like Keohane and Nye offer lucrative solutions to our conflictual world of politics, my viewpoint is that unless powerful states like the United States, Britain, Russia and China give up some (or all) of their power in the international arena, there is really little chance that international cooperation among states will happen.  States are self interested and will act according to what they believe is best for themselves. This is the mindset that has been developing since Thucydedes “Melian Dialougue”  and it is extremely hard to break out of it. Dominant world powers like the United States value one thing above all else: national security. The U.S.  emerged from both World Wars as a key player and important state actor in international relations. This is due to the United States’ concern with military empowerment to ensure its survival. It has continued to build its military power in order to sustain its role as the dominant world power.  Economic power is of importance as well, but for neorealism what is of concern is the national security of the state. Without security, the state cannot engage in other political affairs, it must establish its security before it can give attention to other issues. The anarchic nature of our system has not changed much since the time of Thucydides and “The Melian Dialogue,” where it was made clear that unless a state can provide itself the means to protect itself and its citizens then it has no fighting chance to survive.

            The structure of the international system explains the recurrence of war, and neorealism explains why it will continue to stay the same: states fear other states. So long as other states coexist in the anarchic system, there will be competition and rivalry among countries. A main argument made by neoliberalist against neorealists is the “Democratic Peace Thesis,” (Lecture, 02/02) which states that democratic countries are less likely to fight one another and that the more liberal states there are in the system the more peace there will be. Regime type makes a difference for neo-liberalists. While this is sometimes true, it is most certainly not always the case. Because as long as the state powers in our system dominate (U.S. Britain, Russia etc.) then the likelihood of war will always be on the horizon. “The economic and political powers of these [countries like the U.S. and Britain] nations are reliant on their continuing domination of global markets, international governing bodies such as the United Nations, and the most powerful military organizations in the world” (Shimmin, online). Shimmin argues that most democratic countries engage in undemocratic activities in order to keep their roles in the international arena. His research on democracies gives proof that so long as the current dominant state powers remain in power there is little chance of there being peace, even among existing democracies.

            As long as states coexist in an anarchic system, there will be little prospects for long lasting peace. Neo-realism provides a more realistic portrayal of reality with the state’s emphasis on military power while Neo-liberalism neglects importance aspects of democratic and liberal countries and falls short in providing proof of how and when cooperation has happened.

Works Cited

Jackson R., Sorensen G. Introduction to International Relations. Third Edition. Oxford             Press, 2007. Print.

Betts, R.  Conflict After The Cold War. Third Edition. Pearson Education Inc. 2008. Print.

Shimmin, K. Critique of R. J. Rummel's "Democratic Peace" Thesis. Fall 1999. Web. 25             Feb. 2010.

Sample of Research Work 2

1. Drawing on assigned readings, how is ethnicity important in politics? Be sure to include its impact in the areas of citizenship, electoral politics, social movements, and conflict.

            Ethnicity is a significant variable in politics. In many aspects, ethnicity is the driving force behind a lot of individuals’ and institutions’ motives. It is important to study and discuss ethnicity because history has provided us with an ample amount of examples of how ethnicity has been used by political institutions, and political actors to help shape individuals and their conceptions of their ethnic identity. In helping shape group identities, ethnicity has also helped create nations and their frameworks for citizenship. It has helped determine ethnic cleavages and ethnic boundaries, it has been used as a motivating tool to rally individuals in a pursuit of social change, and also it has been the cause of many conflicts in different nations. Therefore studying the impact ethnicity has on politics provides useful insight and patterns that can help in the future.

            As seen in the case of Germany and France, ethnicity can play a very crucial role in developing the criteria for who can become “French,” or “German.” In his book, Brubaker discusses the question: “On what basis do you belong to a nation?” He argues that citizenship is not just an object of social closure but also an instrument. The process and rules of becoming a citizen of a particular state is left entirely up to that state (Brubaker, 3). This means that the state is allowed to use its discretion however it deems necessary in order to establish the framework for becoming a citizenship of that country. France and Germany offer two very different frameworks under which a person may become integrated into French or German society.

            Brubaker claims that Germany’s strict citizenship rules are the causes of Germany’s history and can be traced back to its early days as Prussia. “Nation and supranational empire were sharply distinct in Germany,” (Brubaker, 4) “the ethno-cultural frontier between Germans and Slavs not only in eastern Prussia but throughout the zone of mixed settlement in the East Central Europe, has been basic to German self understanding” (Brubaker, 5). Why? Because there was a big surge of German eastward migration in the middle ages that had established several groupings of German settlement in Slavic lands (Brubaker, 5-6). Despite living in “enclaves and outposts” in the Slavic East, Germans were able to maintain their culture, language and national identity. This history he argues, “furnished to the German elite a differentialist, bounded model of nation hood, a feeling for the tenacious maintenance of distinctive ethno national identities in zones of mixed populations” (Brubaker, 6). Germany at this point had established itself as a frontier state. The point is that Germany’s shared sense of ethnic identity gave rise to this nationalism that helped shaped their strict citizenship/naturalization laws.

            France’s understanding of nationhood emerged out of completely different circumstances and historical context than Germany’s. Brubaker states that France’s understanding of nationhood was essentially decided by the French Revolution and the repercussions it had (Brubaker, 6). In France’s case, reformists and the general public did not want the privileged elite or other big corporations to benefit from the new nation, (for fear of returning to the old regime of oppression) so they, “gave the concept of nationhood a critical, new dynamic political significance” (Brubaker, 7). When this new reform failed to lead to success, “The radicalized Third Estate constituted itself as the National Assembly and proclaimed [that] membership to [the] sovereign nation [would be] conceived in political, not ethno cultural terms” (Brubaker, 7). This shaped the structure and process of French naturalization. It is a very dramatic contrast in comparison to Germany and its framework concerning citizenship.

            By illustrating the cases of France and Germany, Brubaker offers an important comparison and in doing so effectively demonstrates the deep impact ethnicity can have in politics. As seen in France and Germany, ethnicity can be used instrumentally to create boundaries, restrictions and to uphold certain ethno cultural, nationalistic ideas/norms. Whereas if the state chooses to not use ethnicity as the primary tool of selection it can have definite impact on the process of naturalization. And this is true with France because even in the current day it is easier to become a French citizen than it is to become a German one.

            Germany’s history of ethnic based nationalism affects the process of how one may become a German citizen. In fact, Germany makes it very hard for people (even residents who have been born on German soil) to become a German citizen. This is due to the strong value Germans place on their ethnic identity and its effects are seen through its immigration policies as well. Germany is not very opened to immigration, especially in comparison to France. Years ago, in France, Algerian integration into the French nation was accepted and even welcomed. The state of France cared not if you were of true French descent, but that you could assimilate into French society and learn what it meant to be a French citizen. In Germany you need to provide proof of German blood descent, it is not enough to be born on German land.

            Ethnicity doesn’t just affect a state’s citizenship policy; it also can greatly impact electoral politics. Posner’s “Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa,” really defines as well as illustrates the power ethnicity can have on politics when used instrumentally. Posner argues that, “Political institutions help determine which ethnic cleave becomes politically salient…via two distinct causal mechanisms” (Posner, 3). The first mechanism is through shaping the range of ethnic identities, second is by providing motivation for individuals to select one possible ethnic identity (Posner, 3-5). “This helps coordinate these choices across individual to produce society level outcomes” (Lecture, Feb. 7).

Posner defends his argument on how political institutions can determine an individual’s identity choice with three main propositions: 1) People need/want the resources from the state, 2) They comprehend that the most logical way of getting their resources is by having someone from their ethnic group in a position of political power, 3) They understand that in order to do this, they must form a political coalition group with the rest of their ethnic group (Posner, 4). Basically, political institutions use ethnic cleavages as a way to assemble a wide range of interests, ethnicity makes it easier for political actors to unite people who would otherwise be scattered everywhere with no set political goals. So the use of ethnic cleavages helps to provide policies in a more efficient and quickly manner. It works on the assumption that people will follow a candidate from who shares the same ethnic identity as they do—it provides them comfort in knowing that that political leader will be fighting for that particular ethnic identity’s best interest. “Ethnic identities are assumed to convey information about the likelihood that a person in a position of power will channel resources to another person,” (Posner, 129).

            Regarding social movements, ethnicity also plays a large role and influences the outcomes. In lecture, two explanations of social movements were discussed: Civil Rights Movement and the Ethnic Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Lecture, Feb. 4) Using the example of the Civil Rights movement, there are many factors that led to its success, primarily their shared ethnic identity. Social movements require mobilization and this is more easily done if that specific group shares common beliefs, ideas and values, in other words if they share a common ethnic identity. This facilitates mobilization in that there is little ambiguousness on what each person wants. When a group of people with the same ethnic identity join forces to gain something they want, it is more likely they will succeed because there won’t be too many conflicts or disagreements among themselves to stop progress. The Civil Rights Movement was facilitated because there were common grievances, political opportunity, similar ideology, common interests and the same goals. African Americans felt great pride for their shared ethnic identity and culture. This united them in a way that is difficult to break. Their unity and shared beliefs along with the political opportunity they were fighting for made the movement such a large scale social movement—an effective one at that. In summary, through a shared ethnic identity comes a strong bond and similar beliefs about what is wanted for that group. This unifies a group (like it did in Civil Rights Movement) and makes social change possible. That is not to say it is easy, however, the point here is that ethnic identity plays a big role because it unites people, it is the glue needed for a social movement to have legitimacy and power to get through all the challenges.

            In terms of conflict, ethnicity also plays a crucial role. There are several different kinds of ethnic problems one: the distribution of ethnic groups, two: geographic concentration—scattered or joined, three: dominant group vs. multiple small group (Lecture, March 4). When ethnic groups are close together along boundary lines like they are in Africa that can lead to a lot of disorder that usually results in violence. When these groups are further apart there is less tension because of decreased interaction between them, so this is often a better way for different ethnic groups to coexist next to each other. And like in the case of Cyprus, the dominant vs. multiple small groups factor plays a huge role. In Cyprus, the small minority of Turkish Cypriots living in the northern part of the island was enough to make Turkey stage a full fledge attack on Cyprus after the Greek coordinated coup on the island. So in the case of Cyprus ethnic tensions can lead to ethnic conflict. This isn’t always true, because many nations have lived side by side in conjunction with other ethnic groups different from theirs and have had relatively little to no conflict in their homelands. However, when ethnic pride becomes nationalistic, that becomes a dangerous signal. This is what happened in the case of Cyprus. Greeks became prideful and believed they had the right to invade Cyprus, conquer the island, and make it an expansion of Greece. The Turkish Cypriots responded with even strong violence until a full fledge ethnic conflict ensued. In cases like this, the resolutions are often hard to debate, with some in favor of partition and others a diplomatic agreement. In summary, ethnicity plays a determining role in whether or not conflict will result.  How nations are bordered, and how different ethnic groups interact determine a large part of that country’s future.

            From the readings and lectures, it is clear that ethnicity is very important in politics. Political institutions can use ethnicity to shape identity and that identity determines other crucial aspects of the political system—such as citizenship. In electoral politics, Posner clearly demonstrated how ethnic cleavages are used to determine who is in what group and what each group will get. In regards to social movements, a shared ethnic identity provides a strong foundation for people to come together and fight for a certain cause (as in the Civil Rights Movement). And in terms of conflict, ethnicity also plays a huge role, and this is seen all over the world. Different ethnic groups living together has lead to a lot of violence, (Rwanda, Cyprus, Israel) these are all examples of where conflict has emerged to great lengths primarily due to ethnic differences. So it is safe to say that ethnicity helps determine a lot in politics, and helps shape policy and boundaries.

Works Cited

Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge:             

Harvard University Press, 1992. 4-70. Print.

Burke, Peter J., and Jan E. Stets. Identity Theory. New York: Oxford University Press             Inc., 2009. N. pag. Print

Crothers, Lane, and Charles Lockhart. "Culture and Politics: Social Movements, Collective Identiy, and Political Culture." (2000). Web. 17 Mar. 2010. <https://gauchospace.ucsb.edu/courses/file.php/2420/Cult_Pol.pdf>.

Posner, Daniel N. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 15-80. Print.

             

Sample of Research Work 1

Grecia Hernandez

Political Science 118

Ethnic Divisions Lead to Ethnic Conflict

            In order to understand the reasons for why the Turkish invasion of Cyprus of 1974 occurred, the shared history between Greece and Turkey needs to be discussed and analyzed. By looking at the history of these two countries, the answers will unfold and it will become clear as to why Turkey decided to invade at the time that it did. To solve the puzzle of why the invasion occurred the question: What led to these divisions in the first place,” must be answered. By using an instrumentalist approach to ethnicity, the aim of this paper will be to solve the puzzle of why Turkey invaded Cyprus when it did, and what facilitated the momentous atrocity. Using this approach requires an extensive analysis of the historical events that occurred prior to the invasion. Examining the effects of the state (Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and Britain were all involved) institutions and the elites involved, will illustrate a clearer picture of how these two aspects helped shape ethnic identity and concurrently helped establish the ethnic divisions that culminated in the invasion.

            Turkey’s initial invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974 was provoked by the coup organized and headed by the Greek junta to overthrow the elected president of Cyprus, Archibishop Makarios. The coup was organized and staged by the Cypriot National Guard.[1] They wanted to replace Archibishop Makarios with their own leader, Nikos Sampson in an attempt to unify Cyprus with Greece. Turkey saw this as a threat to the Turkish Cypriot population and decided to invade the country. They justified their intrusion by claiming that it was out of protection for the Turkish Cypriots living in Cyprus (even though this population only makes about 18 percent of the country’s population).[2] After the initial invasion the Greek junta backed off and discussions between London and Geneva began in order to determine what would become of Cyprus. After these negotiations failed to come to any consensus, Turkey invaded once more and despite announcing that it would be a short invasion, they sent out 30,000 troops onto the island on August 14 and took control of nearly 40 percent of the island, with 250, 000 Cypriots displaced.[3]  Turkey defeated the Greek military power with an overwhelming force and declared the island, the “de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” Their invasion involved horrific crimes of war including, mass murder, mass rape, ethnic cleansing (with more than 200,000 Greek Cypriots expelled from Northern Cyprus.[4] This according to the international community was a violation of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (it indeed was a violation). Democracy was supposedly reestablished in the country of Cyprus under the control of Constantine Karamanlis and Glavkos Clerides, with Turkey being the only country to recognize the republic established.[5] 

            Research indicates that the history of Cyprus is a troubled one and it is largely due to the ethnic divides that have been placed for many years. Many scholars also agree that Turkey had been planning an invasion in Cyprus for many years and were waiting for the opportune moment in order to follow through with it.  Partition of Cyprus is something Turkey had wanted long before Cyprus even became an independent country.[6]  However many scholars argue that full blame on Turkey is not right considering the history of the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish people of Cyprus wanted to be recognized by the international community. A scholar and writer, Mr. Denktash argues that, “As years went by and one-sided resolutions contrary to the interests of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey piled up, I became more and more convinced that nothing but a solemn declaration of statehood, combined with intensive efforts to achieve recognition, would move the Greek Cypriot side toward federalism … The world had to see that we existed.”[7] Turkey basically felt like it needed to stand up for itself and they resorted to claiming independence in order to be seen and heard by the international community. This argument opposes the current argument being made by most scholars, that Turkey invaded in order to permanently take control of the island. However, in Mr. Denktash’s writings, he really takes a close look at the suffering of the Turkish Cypriots that had been occurring since 1963. He explains that under the Greek Cypriot internalization, the Turkish minorities were treated as outlaws and that if they had not done anything about it, they would currently still be in the same position. His main argument states that basically Turkey invaded Cyprus because it needed to get attention from the other actors, it needed to do something to get itself out of the suffering the Greek Cypriots had inflicted on the minority.[8] But this is not necessarily true. Turkey had suffered under the Greek Cypriot internalization, but that did not justify the fact that they didn’t just invade the country; they massacred innocent Greek Cypriots in addition to other war crimes. If they were really just looking for attention from the international community, this violence would not have been needed. If Turkey had just wanted to invade Cyprus to make its voice heard, then it would have invaded but it would have refrained from committing such awful atrocities against the Greek Cypriots. The interesting thing about this case is that each country looks back on different time periods in order to justify their position. For example Turkey looks at their period of suffering (1960-1967) while the Greek Cypriots focus on the repercussions of the 1974 invasion.  Going back to the central argument: two main contributing factors gave rise to the 1974 invasion: ethnic/political divisions and differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the coup staged by the Greek Cypriot National Guard.  More significant to the argument however, is the historical ethnic divisions between the two communities that embedded the tensions that finally erupted in a full-scale atrocity. These divisions are closely analyzed in the following paragraphs.

            The conflict between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was installed in the island long before the small country even became independent. Cyprus has a long history of violence; this is due in large part to the colonial history it carries. Under British rule in 1878, Cyprus had already developed its characteristics ethnic divisions that would mark the beginning of their downfall. The majority of inhabitants occupying the island were Greeks (80 percent), with only about 20 percent Turkish Cypriots living up in the northern part of the island. The division is due to the cultural and ethnic ties each community had for their mother country. The Greek Cypriots fully identified themselves with the Greek state, Greek language, and with the Greek Eastern Orthodox Church. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots identified themselves with their mother country of Turkey. This meant they spoke Turkish, followed Turkish culture and the majority of them were devout Muslims of the Sunni sect.[9] Even under constant proximity to each other, both communities managed to stay true to their separate and distinct cultural and ethnic practices. This division turned into a semi-physical separation with the occurrence of the inter-communal violence in 1963.[10]  After the Turkish invasion of 1974, there was an even more defined boundary line between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

            Throughout the rule of the Ottoman and British, several key factors helped to cultivate the growth of the ethnic, cultural and political differences between the two communities. History provides important indications of the contributing causes that led to the division, going as far back as 1571. During this time the Ottoman ruled the island and after bringing the Roman Catholic Church down, they replaced it with the Greek Orthodox Church, making it the supreme institution of the island. With the Church’s status set in place, consequently the Archbishop became the religious and political leader of the Greek Cypriots. This led to the close connection the Greek Cypriot community felt for their Greek culture. A historian and author, Joseph S. Joseph states that, “For the Greek Cypriots, the Church became a symbol of political and ethnic unity. Most of their political, social, cultural, and intellectual life was associated with religious activities and institutions.”[11]  Under the Ottoman military rule and its administration, the two ethnic communities continued to be divided based on religion and ethnicity. The Ottoman administration treated each community as two distinct entities, evidence for this is found once again in Joseph’s book in which he informs, “Taxes were imposed on a denominational basis and administration was carried out with the help of various religious institutions.”[12] This evidence implies that although the Ottoman system of administration helped both communities preserve their ethnic identities, it simultaneously and inevitably embedded politicization of ethnicity. A very dangerous thing to do when dealing with two different ethnic groups living in such close proximity to not only each other, but their mother countries as well. Furthermore, even when Cyprus was under modern bureaucratic British rule, the millet system established by the Ottomans was still set in place. To make matters worse author Joseph illustrates that under the British colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’ it, “Reinforced the ethnic, administrative, and political separation inherited from the Ottoman period. The British administration made no effort to create a unifying Cypriot political culture … [this was] an instrumental [tactic] in securing British control over Cyprus.”[13]

            Another reason why the ethnic conflict between the two communities grew even worse was because all matters concerning education, religion and culture still remained under each individual ethnic group (meaning that the religious institution of each community had control over these matters). For example the education system really emphasized the ethnic differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by promoting the spread of conflicting ethnic values from generation to generation. Their schools were primarily controlled by their respective religious institutions, which placed significant emphasis on religion, national heritage, ethnic values, and the long history of Greek-Turkish rivalry.[14] This education system highly and negatively contributed to the already high tensions between the two communities. Not only did the teaching of national heritage ignite nationality for both communities, it also fostered dangerous emotions: fear and suspicion. With both communities in constant fear of what the other might do to them, the tensions only grew to alarming rates and eventually when the Greek junta staged the coup, all hell broke loose. In sum, the main causal factors that led to the invasion of 1974 are: the millet system established by the Ottomans, church dominance, fragmented ethnic education, growing national loyalties to their mother countries, political polarization, and the British policy of ‘divide and rule’.[15] In other words, institutions placed by the mother countries were what helped each community develop their strong ethnic divisions. Even after the problematic colonial history between Britain and Cyprus ended, the main issue remained to be one of ethnic conflict. With the independence of Cyprus, came new responsibilities for the state, which included taking an active part in the activities of the international arena, and also interacting with other key international players. During this time, Cyprus achieved some significant success: it became a U.N. member, joined the Council of Europe, The British Commonwealth of Nations, and other prominent international organizations.[16] This newfound participation meant that outside parties and institutions could now freely interact with the small island as well as the other countries/parties involved. Evidence for the fact that the ethnic divisions between the two were due to the historical “Ethnic ties between the two Cypriot communities and Greece and Turkey were also instrumental in causing foreign involvement in Cypriot Affairs.”[17] This made it easier to maintain close relations between Greek Cypriots and Greece and between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Turkish Cypriots looked to Turkey for military, economic, diplomatic, and moral support. The same goes for the Greek Cypriots’ relationship with Greece. This dependence further deepened the ethnic divisions and consequently put Cypress under the control of the institutions and elites of Greece and Turkey. Despite the establishment of the Republic of Cypress there was no shared common ground between the two ethnic groups for the country to have a chance of taking care of its own political matters without ethnicity dominating the politics of the country. In sum, the history of the ethnic divisions of Cyprus shows that “Political differentiation of groups along ethnic lines can be conducive for the generation of ethnic conflict. This is especially true if in a bi-communal society there are no cross-cutting linguistic, social, and religious ties or other overarching loyalties …” [18] In addition, it only makes the country more susceptible to conflict when the communal elites are unsuccessful at counteracting the negative effects of ethnic and political fragmentation.

            The events and policies imposed by the Greek and Turkish states only aggravated the ethnic tensions, which was ultimately what facilitated the invasion of 1974 however it does not fully answer the question of why Turkey finally made the decision to invade. Many scholars argue that Turkey had been planning to invade Cyprus for many years and finally had a “legitimate” excuse to intervene. The central argument made before is that Turkey did not invade Cyprus on the grounds of protecting the Turkish Cypriot minority; they invaded because they feared that if Greece annexed Cyprus it would mean serious danger to the security of Turkey, especially because of Cyprus’ key geographical location in the Mediterranean. So logically Turkey wanted to essentially rid itself of an extended Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. However, many scholars argue that Turkey actually did have a legitimate reason to invade. For example, William Hale along with Henry Kissinger argue that under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, Turkey had a more rightful authorization for intrusion than they did back in the invasion of 1964 and 1967. They argue that, “If Turkey had not invaded, then Cyprus would probably have been united with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots massacred or expelled, and the Greek Colonel’s regime consolidated.”[19] Of course Kissinger had a reason to defend Turkey in its decision to invade given that during this time, he believed Turkey’s value to American security interests was of more importance than the Karamanlis Government (Former Prime minister of Greece).[20] Why was Turkey more important? According to authors Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig American interests were vested in Turkey in that, “Turkey housed vital U.S. bases and sophisticated electronic listening-posts along the Soviet border, installations which made possible, for example, intelligence on Russian military moves … and monitoring of Soviet missile activity.”[21] Under these political circumstances there was nothing really to stop Turkey from invading, it had British and U.S. support and despite the fact that it violated international law, Turkey went ahead with the invasion, with the rationale that under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (which prohibits Cyprus to form any union with another state and legitimizes the use of force to preserve the sovereignty of Cyprus),[22] it had the right to intervene in order to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority. However these reasons were merely excuses for invading the island. As stated before, Turkey invaded out of desire to expand, fear and concern for their own security. Also, Vassilis Fouskas brings up a crucial counterargument to the statement issued by Kissinger and Hale: during the time period from 1967 to 1974 there hadn’t really occurred any severe inter-communal events and therefore, “Hale’s assertation cannot be taken as proof of causal links leading to the invasion.”[23] Therefore the invasion of Cyprus had nothing to do with wanting to protect the Turkish minority living there. Due to the long history of ethnic and political division in Cyprus between the Turkish Cypriot minority and Greek Cypriot majority Turkey was able to conveniently use the pretext of invasion “out of protection” for the Turkish minority from the violent Greek junta. Turkey wanted to take full control of the strategically placed island in order to preserve their national security and interests. The divisions put forth by Turkey, Britain and Greece up until Cyprus’ independence, were the key factors that eventually led Turkey to invade in 1974.

            In using an instrumentalist approach to the conflict of ethnicity in Cyprus research has showed that the administrations of the state institutions of Greece and Turkey helped to shape ethnic identity as well as foster a deep sense of permanent nationalism. The religious institutions established by the Ottomans back in the 16th century further nourished nationalistic ties to the respective mother countries and they lasted even up until Cyprus won independence in 1960. Under British control, the divisions were only deeper engraved with the ‘divide and rule’ system it enforced. Some scholars and authors argue that Turkey invaded because it wanted to protect its ethnic minority in northern Cyprus, there are a few that say Turkey invaded because it wanted the Turkish Cypriots to be internationally recognized. While that may be true, the research conducted indicates that the most logical explanation for why Turkey invaded is it was protecting its national interests and security. It wanted full control of Cyprus and they couldn’t risk allowing Greek expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin.  Turkey knew that if Cyprus unified with Greece it would be a danger to Turkish security. What is undoubtedly true in the case of Turkey and Cyprus is that the invasion wouldn’t have occurred had the ethnic tensions between the two communities lessened and improved after Cyprus’ independence. But instead they worsened with time, and the states of Greece and Turkey played the most significant role in promoting dangerous nationalist pride. By examining these state institutions and the systems of administration they put in place, it is easy to see why the invasion occurred when it did and not before or after. As seen in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus: governing a state with political differences that are based on ethnic lines usually result with an eruption of large-scale ethnic conflict.

Works Cited

1. Burke, Peter and Stets, Jan. Identity Theory. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009)

2. Bowman, Jim. “Seeing What’s Missing in Memories of Cyprus.” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 18:199-127. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=2&hid=12&sid=dc283a60-b07e-45df-a7e3-321a81bb7517%40sessionmgr4. (Accessed March 03, 2010).

3. Coufoudakis, Van. International Aggression and Violations of Human Rights: The Case of Turkey in Cyprus. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008).

4. Couloumbis, Theodore A. The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Trouble Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983).

5. Crawshaw, Nancy. “Cyprus.” In Encyclopedia Americana. Danbury, CT: Grolier, 1985.

6. Denktash, Rauf R. The Cyprus Triangle 2nd Edition. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1986), 107

7. Dr. P.N. Vanezis Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony. (Great Britain: The Ptiman Press, Bath, 1977), 62-63.

8. Fouskas, V. Reflections On the Cyprus Issues and the Turkish Invasion of 1974. In the UCSB Article Database,

http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=12&hid=106&sid=c919b0c3-cff3-421b-9738-28ef26bb1f58%40sessionmgr1040 (Accessed February 26, 2010).

9.  Fouskas, Vassilis and Tackie, Alex. Cyprus: The Post Imperial Constitution (New York: Pluto Press, 2009), 20.

10. Hale, William. Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000. (London: Frank Case, 2000), 123.

11.  Joseph, S. Joseph. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. (Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997), 16

12. Mallinson, William. “U.S. Interests, British Acquiescence and The Invasion of Cyprus.” 2007. Volume 9, 494-508. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=6&hid=106&sid=dc283a60-b07e-45df-a7e3-321a81bb7517%40sessionmgr4. (Accessed February 28, 2010).

13. O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian. The Cyprus Conspiracy. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 156.

14. Posner, Daniel. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

15. Stavrinides, Zenon. "A Long Journey to Peace." Harvard International Revew 27.2 (): 84-85. UCSB Library http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=10&hid=103&sid=dc283a60-b07e-45df-a7e3321a81bb7517%40sessionmgr4&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=17274931\. (Accessed March

16.  The Tech. “Turkey Deserves More Blame for Cyprus.” 1994. Volume 114, number 53, http://www.mit.edu:8001/activities/hellenic/tech-articles/athanasiadis.html.

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[1] Fouskas, V. Reflections On the Cyprus Issues and the Turkish Invasion of 1974. In the UCSB Article Database, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=12&hid=106&sid=c919b0c3-cff3-421b-9738-28ef26bb1f58%40sessionmgr1040 (Accessed February 26, 2010).

[2] Fouskas, V. Reflections On the Cyprus Issues and the Turkish Invasion of 1974. In the UCSB Article Database, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=12&hid=106&sid=c919b0c3-cff3-421b-9738-28ef26bb1f58%40sessionmgr1040 (Accessed February 26, 2010).

[3] O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian. The Cyprus Conspiracy. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 156.

[4] Ibid, 160.

[5] Fouskas, V (Accessed February 26, 2010).

[6] Dr. P.N. Vanezis Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony. (Great Britain: The Ptiman Press, Bath, 1977), 62-63.

[7] Denktash, Rauf R. The Cyprus Triangle 2nd Edition. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1986), 107.

[8] Ibid

[9] Joseph,  Joseph. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. (Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997), 16

[10] Ibid, 17-20

[11] Joseph,  Joseph. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. (Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997),17.

[12] Ibid, 16

[13] Ibid, 18.

[14] Joseph, Joseph. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. (Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997), 16

[15] Ibid, 18

[16] Couloumbis, Theodore A. The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Trouble Triangle

(New York: Praeger, 1983).

[17] Joseph, Joseph. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. (Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997), 18.

[18] Ibid, 34.

[19] Hale, William. Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000. (London: Frank Case, 2000), 123.

[20] O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian. The Cyprus Conspiracy. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 199-200.

[21] O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian. The Cyprus Conspiracy. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 200.

[22] Fouskas, Vassilis and Tackie, Alex. Cyprus: The Post Imperial Constitution (New York: Pluto Press, 2009), 20.

[23] Ibid